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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Contracts-Insane Persons' Transactions in North Carolina.
Controversies concerning the status of deeds and contracts made by
insane persons have caused the courts perennial difficulty. Conflicts which
arise between a desire to protect lunatics on one hand and innocent persons dealing with them on the other, and also between the rule that
intent to be bound is necessary to form a contract and the rule that
no person may stultify himself by his own plea' have caused much contradiction among the authorities. 2 The purpose of this note is to
consider the North Carolina decisions relating to these transactions.
Because a "meeting of the minds" is of the essence of a contract, it
has been said in this state that at law the contract of a person non
compos mentis is void and an action for damages for non-performance
will fail.3 Although this is good authority as to entirely executory
contracts, when there has been partial or complete performance the rule
is not followed. When this is the case the insane person is treated as
seeking rescission in equity and relief is granted on the basis of con4
structive fraud.
This theory throws on the alleged lunatic the 'burden of proving
insanity; but only a preponderance of the evidence is required.5 The
Supp.)

This statute did not go into effect until 1934 and the Supreme Court has

not yet passed upon its validity. One of the main purposes of this legislation
was to prevent the competition of cheap prison-made goods with the goods
produced "by free labor.
I This rule is not recognized in North Carolina. Craddock v. Brinkley, 177
N. C. 125, 98 S. E. 280 (1919).
'Such deeds are variously said to be void, as in Hood v. Holligan, 158 So. 759
(Ala. 1935); absolutely voidable, as in Brewster v. Weston, 235 Mass. 14, 126
N. E. 271 (1920) ; and voidable only on certain conditions, as in England. Imperial Loan Co., Ltd. v. Stone, [1892] 1 Q. B. 599. The general holdings are
thoroughly covered by Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 504. The English law is
discussed at length in Cook, Mental Deficiency and the Englis/h Law of Contract
(1921) 21 CoL. L. RFv. 424.
'Carr v. Holliday, 21 N. C. 344 (1836); Cameron-Barkley Co. v. Thornton
Light & Power Co., 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E. 695 (1905).
' Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927) ; Searcy v. Hammett,
202 N. C. 42, 161 S. E. 733 (1931). This rule does not apply to contracts of marriage which are by statute void unless there is birth of issue. N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §2495. However, a proceeding to set aside a marriage for this
cause is a proceeding to dissolve the marriage bonds and alimony may be awarded
pendente lite. Lea v. Lea, 104 N. C. 603, 10 S. E. 488 (1889). But cohabitation
after recovery will not cure the defect. Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S. E. 407

(1897).
rLamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. 436, 86 S. E. 179 (1915). While it is true that only
a preponderance of the evidence and not "clear, strong, and convincing proof" is
required, there is a "natural presumption" of sanity which must be overcome by
the .preponderance. Jones v. Winstead, 186 N. C. 536, 120 S. E. 89 (1923). Mental incapacity may 'be shown by non-expert witnesses. 'Hodges v. Wilson, 165
N. C. 323 81 S. E. 340 (1914). A finding of insanity by an inquisition for that
purpose raises a presumption of fact that such is the case, and is to be admitted
as such a finding and not as the opinion of twelve good men and true. Arrington
v. Short, 10 N. C. 71 (1824) ; Armstrong v. Short, 8 N. C. 11 (1820). But the
finding is not binding and may be rebutted. Parker v. Davis, 53 N. C. 460 (1862).
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cases approve two charges as a measure of mental capacity: 1. Did the
party know what he was about? 2. Did the party realize the nature
and scope of his acts? Either of these is sufficient, but both may be
used.( If the evidence satisfies this test the insane person is entitled to
relief." This statement is, however, subject to an exception based on a
policy of protecting innocent persons who have dealt with lunatics; but
a party relying on this has the burden of establishing certain conditions
which the court has laid down as prerequisite to sustaining the contract
or deed of an insane person.8
The exact scope of these conditions is somewhat in doubt. An early
case sets them out thus: That the other party must have acted (1) in
good faith, (2) without knowledge of the incapacity, (3) without taking
advantage of the lunatic, (4) for a full consideration, (5) which manifestly went for the benefit of the insane person.9 A later case in a
similar list omits the last of these, but adds another, that the person -non
compos inentis be unable to restore the status quo.10 The most recent
North Carolina decision in point apparently not only disregards the
requirement of benefit to the lunatic, but also that the consideration
must be full. 1 There are dicta, but, so far as a thorough search revealed, no direct holdings, to the effect that the contracts and deeds of a
person adjudicated insane are void and not voidable only, hence this
12
exception does not apply to such cases.
'Cameron-Barkley Co. v. Thornton Light & Power Co., 138 N. C. 365, 50 S. E.
695 (1905). The same tests apply to cases of extreme drunkenness. Burch v.
Scott,
168 N. C. 602, 84 S. E. 1035 (1915).
7
Goodwin v. Parker, 152 N. C. 672, 68 S. E. 208 (1910). Since the basis of
setting aside deeds in this state is fraud, a subsequent bona fide purchaser without
notice is protected. Adam v. Riddick, 104 N. C. 515, 10 S. E. 609 (1889). Hence,
it is a fraud for one who has knowingly dealt with a lunatic to convey any property
which he has obtained to another and the proceeds of such sale may be traced as
a trust. Sprinkle v. Wellborn, 140 N. C. 163, 52 S. E. 666 (1905).
'Riggan v. Green, 80 N. C. 237 (1879); Ipock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158
N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912).
'Riggan v. Green, 80 N. C. 237 (1879).
10
Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927).
u Searcy v. Hammett, 202 N. C. 42, 161 S. E. 733 (1931) (Suit by payee on
defendant's endorsement of an extension note by a corporation of which he was a
stockholder. Defendant was insane at the time and the only benefit which he
received was the extension of time on the debt of the corporation. A judgment
for the defendant was reversed. The court said that there was consideration for
the note. Thus, although the holding may be regarded as merely that the note
was ordinarily enforceable, it would seem unnecessary to send the case back unless
there was also enough benefit to the lunatic to meet the requirement. But this
extension can hardly be said to have been a full consideration manifestly to the
benefit of the insane person.)
" Ipock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158 N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912) ; Wadford
v. Gillette, 193 N. C. 413, 137 S. E. 314 (1927).
Contracts as to necessities are enforced on a theory of implied contract and
are not really an exception to the general rule. Thus a person who furnishes
money at the request of one not an agent or guardian of the insane may recover.
Surles v. Pipkin, 69 N. C. 513 (1873).
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The lunatic's privilege to rescind is not, however, an absolute one.
He must tender back any benefit which he has received,' 8 or at least
4
the court has within its discretion the power to require him to do so.1
Another class of cases in which fraud is presumed must be distinguished. In these, the showing is not total incompetency, but only mental -weakness. In order to raise a presumption of fraud under such
proof it is necessary to demonstrate some further "inequitable incidents
-such as undue influence, great ignorance, want of advice, and inadequate consideration."' 15 The fraud presumed from these circumstances is fraud in fact and may be rebutted by any evidence. Accordingly, it would seem that "presumption" here means "enough evidence
to go to the jury on an issue of fraud. ' u 6
The trend of the cases seems to be away from the earlier rule of
according high protection to insane persons in their business dealings
and toward a policy of protecting those who in good faith trade with
them. Particularly is this true in the cases involving the title to land.
The question essentially resolves itself into a choice between throwing
a loss on one of two innocent parties. A frank recognition of this
problem by the courts would perhaps bring about a more satisfactory
result in particular cases than the present a priori rules.
PETER HAIRSTON.

Insurance-Misrepiesentation-Effect of Agent's Knowledge of
Falsity of Statements in Application for Policy.
In an action on an insurance policy it appeared that insured had
stated in his application for reinstatement of the policy that he was in
good health, when as a matter of fact he had diabetes. Both insured
and the agent who wrote the policy knew this. The trial court charged
that in the absence of fraud or collusion between the agent and insured,
the agent's knowledge would be imputed to the company. The jury
found for the plaintiff. Held, judgment affirmed.'
Perhaps the clearest type of situation calling for the application of
the doctrine stated by the trial judge in this case is found when the
policy provides that it shall be void if certain facts are present, and the
agent has full knowledge of the presence of such facts. Thus, where
" West v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 231, 65 S. E. 979 (1909).
"' lpock v. Atl. & N. C. Ry. Co., 158 N. C. 445, 74 S. E. 352 (1912).
'Smith v. Beatty, 37 N. C. 456 (1843) ; Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
16 Suttles v. Hay, 41 N. C. 124 (1848).
The issue submitted to the jury in these
cases is not mental competency, but fraud. Dixon v. Green, 178 N. C. 205, 100
S. E. 262 (1919).
"Colson v. State Mutual Assurance Co., 207 N. C. 581, 178 S. E. 211 (1935).

